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## MOOT POINTS IN SOCIOLOGY.

### V. THE SOCIAL FORCES.

If the sociological harvest has so far proved scanty, it is not because the soil is poor, but because it is so rich that the tares choke the wheat. It is long since the first clearing was made in the jungle, yet the rank growth of errors and fallacies never ceases. No sooner is a false hypothesis or a misleading analogy cut down than a fresh one springs up in its place. From the soil seems to rise a miasma that makes the tillers giddy. Many of those who thrust in the spade may ere long be seen sedulously watering and tending some grotesque speculative growth which cumbers the ground, and which will have to be uprooted if there is to be a crop. Such is the picture that presents itself when one notes the reigning uncertainty and confusion in respect to the causes of social phenomena.

In his *First Principles* Spencer adopts a mechanical interpretation of society, and dwells on those aspects of social life which seem to illustrate the principles of his evolutionary philosophy. I have elsewhere<sup>1</sup> shown that he established analogies, but not identities of principle, and that the social laws he set up by the simple process of extending cosmic laws over social facts are in many cases untrue.

In his later work Spencer renounces his early indiscretions, and they might well be left unnoticed had not Professor Giddings given them a new lease of life. He conceives that social facts admit of a double interpretation, the objective and the subjective. Things happen in society, no doubt, because of men's desires, but also because a part of cosmic energy is converted into organic and social energies. "Social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution." In the expansion of states, the movement of population toward opportunities, the concentration of men in cities, the course of exchanges, the lines of legislative policy, and the direction of religious, scientific, and educational

<sup>1</sup> In the second paper of this series.

movements, he sees motion following the line of least resistance. "Religion, morals, philosophy, science, literature, art, and fashion, are all subject to the law of rhythm." The integration, differentiation, and segregation that go on in society have like causes with the corresponding cosmic processes.

It is hard to find warrant for this dual interpretation. After an activity has been explained in terms of motive, why re-explain it in terms of energy? If a principle such as *men go where they can most easily satisfy their wants* accounts for the currents of migration, why interpret them on the principle that *motion follows the line of least resistance*? If the rhythms that appear in every field of interest from dress to religion occur because "attention demands change in its object," why class them with rhythms due to "conflict of forces not in equilibrium." As for the processes of integration, differentiation, and segregation among men, I have already shown that they differ in principle from the processes of cosmic evolution.

A more common error is the assumption that social phenomena are to be interpreted as the interaction of two sets of factors, one external, the other internal. Under such terms as race and locality, man and environment, folk and land, this dualism constantly occurs in sociological writing.

There are, no doubt, social processes which may properly be said to have both internal and external causes. The numerical movement of population may be conceived as the product of psychic factors—procreative impulses, desire for offspring, etc.—which determine the birth-rate, with physical factors—seasons, crops, etc.—which determine the death-rate. Again, the size of a crop depends upon the acreage (which men can control) and upon the weather (which men cannot control). The herring catch depends at once on the desire for herring and on the size of the "run."

Most of the instances, however, that form the stock-in-trade of the environment school do not support their case at all. Migrations and colonizations, the territorial distribution of population, the distribution of labor among the various occupations, the investment of capital, the location of cities, the lines of

communication, and the currents of trade, have human volitions as their proximate causes, and not the features of the physical environment.

The ground for so bold an assertion is the neglected distinction between the factors of a telic event and the factors of the volition that brings about the event. Let me illustrate. If a boatman, aiming to reach a pier on the other side of a swift river, fails to allow for the current, he may be swept a quarter of a mile below his destination. In such a case it may be permissible to explain the outcome as the joint effect of the man's volition and the force of the current. But if the boatman "allows for" the current, and keeps the bow of the boat sufficiently upstream to land him at the pier, we explain the outcome either as the realization of a purpose, or as the resultant of the force of the current and the muscular force applied to the propulsion of the boat. We can adopt either the teleological or the mechanical explanation. But since both the physical factors *were perceived and calculated in advance*, we should never think of combining the two explanations; they are alternative, not dual.

Now, the local distribution of immigrants in a region can and should be explained in terms of purpose. It is only when, pressing farther back, we undertake to account for their purposes that we come upon considerations relating to climate, soil, water, timber, and the like. Similarly, a railway net has all its causes in the volitions of the men who had it built. The topography of the country enters into the case only as affecting the motives that determine these volitions. It is a dim recognition of this distinction that leads most writers to speak of the physical environment as "influence" rather than cause.

Undoubtedly men's choices are conditioned and their projects limited by the physical framework they live in. *Mesology* or the study of the influence of the environment will always be a fascinating chapter in our science. Still, since the external facts are foreseen and taken into account in intelligent telic action, it is necessary to regard social phenomena as essentially psychic, and to look for their immediate causes in mind.

Another error consists in identifying these causes with *needs* rather than *wants*. Usually *need* means what we think people *ought* to want. But it is what people actually desire that controls their behavior and directs their social activity. The follies and frivolities of people, their vanities, lusts, and vicious inclinations, cannot be left out of the reckoning in a theory of society as it is, or even of society as it might be.

Some would lend the needs theory a philosophic basis by interpreting *need* as "requisite for survival," as that which helps one live, work, compete, reproduce. They argue that those who do not desire the useful will in the long run be eliminated. Since natural selection is constantly trimming down wants to make them square with needs, all the principal social activities can be looked upon as "functions." Here the fact is overlooked that man has climbed out of the cock-pit, and his life is now, on the whole, a struggle for happiness rather than for bare existence. Because they multiply up to the limit of the food supply, animals pass their lives in providing for their needs. A living is all they get. If a people breeds *à la* Malthus, it too will be absorbed in supplying its needs. But foreseeing man *underbreeds*, and so wins elbow room, gains a margin of energy which is soon claimed by new wants. Property is a stockade which keeps the wolf of hunger at bay and permits the owner indulgences and gratifications that have no bearing on survival. Had no such space been cleared, how could the higher interests and pursuits have come into being?

In the presence of the great recurrent social activities the needs theory looks plausible. Of course, family life, industry, government, and warfare can be looked upon as welfare activities. It is even possible to give to religion, law, morals, education, and art a functional interpretation and to ignore the specific non-essential cravings that in these spheres seek their satisfaction. But the theory breaks down when confronted with those dynamic activities which, because they are *occasional*, must rank as *luxuries* and not as *necessities*. Such are the expansion of the Arabs incited by Mahomet, the monastic movement, the Crusades, the Renaissance, the wars of religion, the proselyting conquests of

revolutionary France, the anti-slavery movement, the spread of foreign missions, and the expansion of the higher education. These have to be stated in terms of desire, and accounted for by those things which arouse desire, namely, new ideas and beliefs.

Hardly have we focused down to the great truth, first emphasized by Dr. Ward, that *the social forces are human desires*, when we come upon a new crop of errors.

First is the notion, fostered by the organic conception of society, that the diverse desires of individuals are, as it were, melted down into a desire for the social welfare, and that this generalized force it is which furnishes the driving power for the various "social organs." Even Spencer is apt to attribute a social structure either to the individual sense of a common interest or to the common sense of individual interest, and to overlook the rôle of specific desires in generating particular institutions. Thus in his account of domestic institutions he under-rates the rôle of sexual jealousy, which in certain places has had much to do with determining the form of the family. He regards religious practices as instigated by fear, and fails to notice that in certain developments of religion the love of a benignant deity and the craving for certain ecstatic experiences have become important springs of worship.

In his account of law, after distinguishing between laws that are personally derived and those that are impersonally derived, Spencer states that the force which calls the latter into being is "the *consensus* of individual interests." A more exhaustive analysis shows that along with the general desire to safeguard individual interests should be reckoned such factors as the desire for fair play, and sympathy with the resentment of the wronged man.

Again, in considering the political forces Spencer states that "governing agencies during their early stages are at once the products of aggregate feeling, derive their powers from it, and are restrained by it." The fact is overlooked that along with the aggregate feeling there is a specific desire—the love of power—which, although animating only the few, continually

crowds government beyond what the general feeling approves. On the other hand, another specific force—the impatience of restraint—may defeat an exercise of control which is generally demanded.

Truly extraordinary is De Greef's idea of the "forces" which carry on the social "functions." Since there are seven kinds of social "organs" or "tissues," there are seven kinds of collective force resident in these tissues; thus there is a collective scientific force, a collective economic force, and even—Heaven save the mark!—a "collective reproductive force."

Another error is the assumption of a quantitative relation between desire and some non-spiritual form of energy, or between one species of desire and another species.

Winiarski, for example, insists that feeling, thought and will are forms of kinetic biotic energy. The chemical energy stored up in the tissues, when it is converted into heat, gives rise to vital and psychic phenomena. The strength of a particular desire will depend upon the quantity of energy stored up in the tissues and upon the intensity of the external stimulus. The direction of the discharge is always toward pleasure. "Man is a chariot and pleasure is the charioteer."

The primordial forms of biotic energy are *hunger* and *love*, but by check these can be converted into other orders of desire just as the arrest of a moving body transforms its motion into heat, light, and electricity. Thus when, among primitive men, the strong are not strong enough to kill and eat the weak, their balked appetite reappears as a desire to dominate. If the equality of strength becomes too great to admit of slavery, the unsatisfied lust of domination is transformed into envy. Similarly the sex appetite, obstructed in its main channel, gives rise to sympathy, philanthropy, poesy, the artistic impulses, and the longings of the religious mystic. It is the repression of the propensities that found scope in primitive promiscuity that gives rise to the domestic and social affections!

Winiarski boldly applies his principle of equivalence. He argues that, since the transformation of hunger and love into the higher wants means the conversion of potential into kinetic

energy, the evolution of a civilization involves a lowering of the potential of a people and its eventual replacement by a fresh, unexhausted race. I have elsewhere<sup>1</sup> shown that the race decline which does, in fact, frequently attend social progress is due, not to the lavish expenditure of energy in social achievement, but to needless social mis-selections.

He conceives further that examples, ideas, and commands radiate from the classes and persons of greater energy to those of less energy, this radiation taking the form of the authority and influence the superior exercises over the inferior. It follows that this passage of energy tends to terminate in an equalizing of intensities and a state of equilibrium. Winiarski forgets that, while the communication of ideas does tend to equalize the wise and the simple, the exercise of command does not tend to equalize superior and subordinate and so put an end to itself. It may continue for centuries.

The endeavor to translate desire into physical antecedents shatters on the fact that desires flow out from consciousness, and their objects depend greatly on the contents and processes of the mind. It is true that sexual desire, the craving for exercise, and such passions as hope, fear, and anger, reflect the bodily condition, and may easily figure as forms of physiological energy. But the *values* and *ideals*, which lure us with equal power in weakness as in health, in old age as in our prime, vary not so much with our bodily condition as with our way of thinking. So long as we *think* the same of an object we desire it with undiminished intensity. But if we see it in a new light, it ceases to gleam. An *ideal*, which is a peculiar set imparted to our admiration, a *value*, which is a peculiar set given to our judgment, is to be explained by our experiences. The assurance that my ambition to become an athlete or a *raconteur* is a mode of biotic energy tells you nothing. What you want is an account of the impressions, ideas, or reasonings which lead me to attach worth to these things.

Desire may or may not be a form of energy. In any case it is certain that a mechanical interpretation cannot help us to pre-

<sup>1</sup> "Social Selections," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1903.



dict the choices of people. At the lower animal levels action is easy to gauge, because life consists in an interplay of stimulus and reaction. Higher up this is complicated by the associative memory, and the response to inner or outer stimuli is not so sure or uniform. Yet the simplicity and uniformity of the organism's relations with its environment are such that the influence of remembered experience upon present reactions is slight. At the level of primitive man we find successive individual experiences and reactions fusing and giving rise to processes of consciousness which yield such constants as language, custom, and myth. Moreover, a considerable portion of psychic energy has become emancipated from stimulus and manifests itself in spontaneous activities of a festal character.

In the civilized man we miss that mechanical simplicity which makes the lower psychic life so transparent and predictable. The key to his behavior lies no longer in the play of stimuli upon him, but in his consciousness. This has gathered in volume and consistency until his center of gravity lies here rather than in current impressions. The mental content has acquired such mass, and experience has been wrought up into such forms—idea, concept, formula, ideal—that at each moment they are more determinative than are the external conditions. Stable character becomes possible. A quantitative relation between stimulus and reaction may no longer be assumed. The specific response is now repressed, now many times greater than one would expect. Energy no longer flows freely away in the form of play, but is largely absorbed in series of volitional acts, planned with reference to an end.

With the growth in the diameter and complexity of consciousness, the man's actions become ever more incalculable to those who attend only to the non-psychic factors, such as physique, temperament, state of health, climate, aspect of nature, the solicitation of the moment. The reason is that life has become spiritualized. The non-psychic factors have become less decisive than that organized body of experience we call the personality. Hence, in order to anticipate action, it is more important to explore the personality than to attend to the external factors.

Now, what *experience* is to the *individual*, *culture* is to the *race*. Just as, on the higher levels of individual life, physical and physiological causation retreat in favor of psychic causes, so, on the higher levels of social life, geographic and racial factors lose in significance, and social destiny is determined more by such bodies of organized experience as language, law, morals, religion, the arts and the sciences. There is, in fact, a double reason for affirming that in a civilized people the causes of social phenomena will be essentially psychic. The actions of persons will reflect the influence of that organized embodiment of individual experience we call personality, and they will reflect the influence of that organized embodiment of collective experience we call civilization. In this case an interpretation of social phenomena without reference to the constitution and character of the individual mind, or to the constitution and character of the social mind, will be unsatisfying. Since, now, the main purpose of sociology is to enable us to understand and to forecast the activities of civilized men, we are justified in insisting that it is chiefly a psychical science. Its causes are to be sought in mental processes, its forces are psychic forces, and no ultimate non-psychic factors should be recognized until it is shown just how they are able to affect motive and choice.

Having made clear the nature of the social forces, let us now consider their classification.

About us we see men impelled by a score of instincts, lured by a hundred goals. Are they all seeking the same thing? "Yes," says the hedonist, "look close, and all aims shrivel to one, the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain."

Considering all the forging it has undergone, it would be strange if human nature were so simple. There are the *instincts*. Long before our race had wit enough to classify actions as pleasure-yielding and pain-yielding, tree-life and cave-life had equipped it with instincts which are still alive. For example, then were laid down in our nervous apparatus fear reactions, once salutary, but now useless. The dread of the dark, of loud noises, of open places, of clammy objects, of loneliness, cannot now be

interpreted as shrinkings from the painful. Under our present conditions of life they are meaningless.

Then there are the *impulses*. Can action under the spur of jealousy or anger be interpreted as a yielding to the greatest attraction? Panics, lynchings, and riots are not forms of pleasure-seeking, but manifestations of fear, hate, or blood-thirst.

Again, the creature whose ancestors ran a gauntlet of severe tests is certain to be energetic, to deploy its faculties under slight stimulus. If, now, the serious demands of existence become less taxing, the creature will relieve itself of its super-abundant energy in play activities. While the free forth-flowing of energy yields enjoyment, and the obstruction of it causes distress, pleasure is not really the object of play. Mere gamboling is aimless, its cause is a *vis a tergo*. In sports and games the object is not pleasure, but a feat, a score, a triumph. Hedonism would apply to a race of canny but tired beings.

"But," it may be urged, "granting that many of man's original promptings are not hedonic, will he not, when he has reflected upon his experiences, seek to repeat the pleasant impressions and to inhibit such actions as entailed disagreeable consequences? Applying the sure touchstones of pleasure and pain, will he not free himself from the thralldom of instincts and impulses, and remold his life on rational lines?"

This assumes that the action of reason is to weed out interests so far as they do not justify themselves as pleasure-yielding. But, in truth, reason creates interests as well as destroys them. In its restless explorations it comes upon problems which exercise fresh allurements. While critical minds are dissecting to death old ideals, creative spirits are setting up new goals. Hence every burst of intellectual activity is pregnant with new zests and enthusiasms. Men as they mount above the plane of instinct do not become simply more canny and calculating. Copernicus, Pascal, Newton, and Darwin were not arch-hedonists. Master-intellects, like Socrates and Bruno, are found sacrificing themselves for their ideals. The fact is, reason turned inward may destroy ideals, but turned upon the world or upon men it kindles

fresh interests. Possibly conscious pleasure-seeking marks the morning of intelligence rather than its high noon.

Then there is a social factor to be considered. In the collective mind are set up currents which carry us far out of our natural course. We like what others like, covet what they praise. If we imbibe admiration for a dexterity or a virtue, we cannot but incorporate it into our ideal and strive to realize it. If others infect us with a valuation, we cannot help pursuing the thing valued. From the *élite* spread feelings and opinions about the goals of endeavor which in time harden into race ideals and race values. The rank and file for the most part accept these, because they cannot constitute goals for themselves. So, strangely enough, it may come to pass that the many pursue, not the gratifications proper to their own natures, but the gratifications proper to the natures of the influential *élite*.

Thus we are forced to recognize the multiplicity of desires. Of the various human goals we can affirm just one thing: *they shine*. To affirm that they shine because they all have a component of pleasure is to go too far. There is no social force; there are social forces.

To reject the formula of "greatest pleasure for least pain" is not to attack the foundation principle of pure economics, namely, *greatest utility for least disutility*. Material goods are *means*, not *ends*. Economic choices relate to *routes*, not to *goals*. Of rival goals we do not invariably ask, "Which promises the most pleasure;" but of the possible routes to any goal we do ask, "Which is the easiest?" Whatever be his goal, the rational man will choose the smoothest path, provide in the cheapest manner such bridges and corduroy as may be necessary. If he has not means enough to attain all his ends commodiously, he economizes goods. If he can produce these goods, he economizes his time and exertion. Hence, his choice among possible materials, processes, occupations, and investments conforms to a principle. But we find no such universal principle determining which, among competing instincts, impulses, ideals, and values shall prevail. These are, in fact, treated as incommensurable. No one reduces them all to a common denominator.

The principle of economizing any requisite that is limited in quantity—material resources, time, energy, etc.—can be observed even in our mode of gratifying the higher cravings. The law of parsimony is operative when the devotee seeks to become *en rapport* with his deity by a minimum of pious exercises, when the sportsman expends just enough effort to win the points in the game, when the student seeks out the teachers and texts that put him most quickly in possession of the coveted knowledge, when the philanthropist takes as his motto "Help the poor to help themselves," when the parent rears the least number of offspring that will insure him the domestic pleasures.

Coming now to actual classifications, we will consider those of Small, Ratzenhofer, Ward, and Stuckenberg.

Professor Small classifies human cravings as desires for *health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness*. This grouping appears to be defective at a number of points. Hunger and love are *specific* demands, and not a desire for health. Health, moreover, when people do begin to care for it, is valued, not as an end, but as a *sine qua non* of all satisfactions whatsoever. As for the desire for wealth, it is secondary, depending upon the intensity of those cravings which cannot well be satisfied without the aid of material goods or services. The "lordship over things" which Professor Small advances as a primary motive to acquisition gratifies an egotic desire. It does not differ in principle from the lust of lordship over persons (power) or lordship over men's attention (notoriety) or lordship over men's admirations (glory) or lordship over men's judgment (influence). Under sociability are lumped together desires so diverse as the craving for companionship, and the eagerness for appreciation, the one affective, the other egotic.

Ratzenhofer has employed the word *interest* for the force, whether vital or psychic, which calls out any activity. The term is wide enough to include function, tropism, reflex, and blind impulse, as well as conscious desire. He distinguishes—

- a) *The race interest, i. e., the impulses which center in the reproductive functions.*
- b) *The physiological interest, i. e., hunger and thirst.*

With the rise of consciousness other interests develop out of these two primitive interests. The former expands into —

c) *The egotic interest, i. e., the entire circle of self-regarding motives.*

The latter widens into —

d) *The social interest.*

In proportion as the lower interests are sated, the impetus of thought awakens a feeling of dependence upon the infinite, which gives rise to —

e) *The transcendental interest, which creates religion and philosophy.*

The above is a comprehensive view of the forces that impel living beings, but it is not the best classification of the forces present in human societies. It may be doubted if impulses ought to be grouped solely with reference to their concrete objects, such as species, organism, self, society, cosmos.

Dr. Ward, who has done more than anyone else to elucidate the social forces, makes the following classification:

Physical forces (function bodily)	{	Ontogenetic forces.	{	Positive, attractive (seeking pleasure).
				Negative, protective (avoiding pain).
Spiritual forces (function psychic)	{	Phylogenetic forces.	{	Direct, sexual.
				Indirect, consanguineal.
	{	Sociogenetic forces	{	Moral (seeking the safe and good).
				Æsthetic (seeking the beautiful).
				Intellectual (seeking the useful and true).

For the purposes of philosophy this grouping impresses me as by far the most helpful that has been made. If my own grouping is somewhat different, it is because for practical use in sociology I prefer a classification based more immediately upon the nature of the desires, and neglecting the functions to which they lead.

Dr. Stuckenberg has grouped the social forces as follows:

- I. Fundamental.
  1. The economic.
  2. The political.

- II. Constitutional.
  - 3. The egotic.
  - 4. The appetitive.
  - 5. The affectional.
  - 6. The recreative.
- III. Cultural.
  - 7. The æsthetic.
  - 8. The ethical.
  - 9. The religious.
  - 10. The intellectual.

Without the "fundamental" forces this scheme would be excellent. It is surely an error, however, to list the desire for wealth among the original social forces. It is, in fact, clearly derivative. Avarice is so powerful because nearly every kind of craving sooner or later puts in a requisition for goods. The attractiveness of wealth is the sum of all the furtherances we receive from it in the pursuit of our ends. The state likewise is an instrument of many uses, and appeals to no one group of desires. The specific desires that operate in the sphere of government—the love of power and the impatience of restraint—have other spheres of manifestation, and cannot properly be termed *political*. They are, in fact, *egotic*. For the rest, early government rests on *fear*—fear of the enemy, fear of the marauder. After life and property have become secure, the state is utilized for the promotion of many cultural purposes, so that nearly every group of social forces gives off a demand for state activity.

Would it not be better to arrange the springs of action in two planes, instead of forcing them into one plane? *Desires* may well be distinguished from *interests*, the former being the primary forces as they well up in consciousness, the latter the great complexes, woven of multicolored strands of desire, which shape society and make history.

Desires may be divided into *natural* and *cultural*, the former being present even in natural men, the latter emerging clearly only after man has made some gains in culture. The *natural* desires may be grouped into—

a) *Appetitive*. Hunger, thirst, and sex-appetite.

- b) *Hedonic*. Fear, aversion to pain, love of warmth, ease, and sensuous pleasure.
- c) *Egotic*. These are demands of the *self* rather than of the *organism*. They include shame, vanity, pride, envy, love of liberty, of power, and of glory. The type of this class is ambition.
- d) *Affective*. Desires that terminate upon others: sympathy, sociability, love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger, revenge.
- e) *Recreative*. Play impulses, love of self-expression.

The *cultural* desires, which are clearly differentiated only in culture men, are:

- f) *Religious*. Yearning for those states of swimming or unconditioned consciousness represented by the religious ecstasy.<sup>1</sup>
- g) *Ethical*. Love of fair play, sense of justice.
- h) *Æsthetic*. Desire for the pleasures of perception, *i. e.*, for enjoyment of "the beautiful."
- i) *Intellectual*. Curiosity, love of knowing, of learning, and of imparting.

While the study of the *natural* wants belongs to anthropology, the development of *cultural* desires in connection with association and the presence of culture devolves upon sociology. I ignore the topic here only because it has been adequately treated by others.

There are certain huge complexes of goods which serve as means to the satisfaction of a variety of wants. These are Wealth, Government, Religion, and Knowledge. In respect to these the various elementary social forces therefore give off impulses which run together and form the *economic*, *political*, *religious*, and *intellectual* interests, which constitute in effect the chief history-making forces.

The *economic interest* finds its tap-root in the pangs of hunger and cold. These, being a direct demand for material goods, give rise to wealth-getting activities. There is, however, in the end no class of cravings which may not lay claim to goods, and thus whet greed to a keener edge. When personal emulation takes the form of "conspicuous waste," the egotic desires prompt to acquisition. When gold "gilds the straitened fore-

<sup>1</sup> No one who has seen people "getting happy" at a camp-meeting will doubt the reality or the seductiveness of such states. JAMES, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, studies these in the scientific spirit. BRINTON, *The Religion of Primitive Peoples*, raises a doubt if these cravings are exclusively cultural.



head of the fool," it is prized as the means of winning the coveted mate. When entertainment is expensive, money is sought to oil the wheels of social intercourse. When the gods respect persons, men will seek the wherewithal for costly sacrifices and sanctuaries. When wealth gives lordship, the ambitious will rowel hard in the pursuit of fortune. When the artist works for the highest bidder, the beauty-lover will set himself to money-making. Whenever Dives enjoys greater social consideration, stands higher with the Unseen, is a more formidable suitor, finds bigger meshes in the law, and counts as a worthier person than the better man with the lighter purse, all the streams of desire pour into one channel, and avarice swells to monstrous proportions.

In general, the itch for wealth varies directly with its capacity to promote the satisfaction of the various desires. Since this capacity varies from place to place and from age to age, *the value of wealth is subject to rise and fall.*

The assertion that wealth in general is liable to appreciate or depreciate seems a hard saying. Have we not been taught there can be no general rise or fall in exchange values? Against what, indeed, shall wealth be measured? Where are the markets which register its fluctuations?

But such markets exist, always have existed. Are there not streets where woman's virtue is sold? Are there not commonwealths where there is a ruling price for votes? Do not the comparative rewards of occupations indicate what inducements will overcome the love of independence, of safety, of good repute? We see men sacrificing health, or leisure, or family life, or offspring, or friends, or liberty, or honor, or truth, for gain. The volume of such spiritual goods Mammon can lure into the market measures the power of money. By the choices men make in such cases and by the judgment others pass upon such choices we can ascertain what is the social estimate of wealth. When gold cannot shake the nobleman's pride of caste, the statesman's patriotism, the soldier's honor, the wife's fidelity, the official's sense of duty, or the artist's devotion to his ideal, wealth is cheap. But when maidens yield themselves to senile

moneybags, youths swarm about the unattractive heiress, judges take bribes, experts sell their opinions to the highest bidder, and genius champions the cause it does not believe in, wealth is rated high.

The fluctuations in the market where spiritual goods are sacrificed for material goods are commonly supposed to originate on the side of the higher goods. The material wants, it is reasoned, partake of the stability of the organism itself. It is the aspirations for the good, the true, and the beautiful that are variable.

This interpretation is probably wrong. Usually it is the esteem of wealth that fluctuates and not the esteem of health, or liberty, or honor. These are fundamentals and therefore relatively stable. Wantonness, sycophancy, and subserviency violate personal instincts. Hypocrisy, fraud, and espionage outrage natural feelings and come about as hard one age as another. For each race the loathing of them is nearly a constant, varying little from fathers to sons.

In fact, we do not need to explain the zigzag course of the market for spiritual goods by assuming a shifting in the stress of human wants. Since wealth is a *means*, the importance of wealth must constantly fluctuate *because of changes in the power of material goods to gratify desire*.

These result from changes in *technique*, in *custom*, or in *opinion*.

Thus the introduction of perfumes and spices gave new sensuous gratifications, spirituous liquors provided a short-cut to social pleasure, armor opened a way to security, the breaking of the horse to saddle provided a form of dignified locomotion. The coming in of cattle enabled heads of kine to be trophies as well as scalp-locks and captives. The discovery of medicaments gave new weapons against disease. The origination of art products provided new embodiments of beauty. The art of embalming met in a way the longing for immortality. Memorial tablets, urns, and monuments offered themselves to the same need. Since by exchange any good may be converted into any other, each of these cases added to the desirability of wealth-in-general.

It is, however, shiftings of custom and opinion that have most affected the importance of material goods. The custom of wife-purchase, the system of *wergeld*, the acceptance of damages as a salve for injury, the shifting of prestige from heads, scalps, and bear's claws to herds, acres, and bonds, the reliance upon clothing instead of tattooing as a means of charming the opposite sex, the belief that burnt-offerings win the favor of the gods or that masses deliver the soul from purgatory, the decline of prophetism, the rise of a regular market for female virtue, the passing of political power from the Elders or the Fighters to the Wealthy, the decay of the distinction between noble and mean employments or sources of wealth, the yielding of patrician ranks to *parvenu* pressure, the obliterating of caste cleavage by class, the lapsing of birth as a ground of social superiority, the gaining of "conspicuous consumption" on "conspicuous leisure" as a means of good repute, the enlistment of the artist in the service of Cræsus instead of the service of temple or church—these have at various times augmented the powers of wealth, and driven the spur into the flank of greed.

There are other movements which have shorn lucre of some of its brute might and exalted the worth of personal merit or effort. The resumption of choice by women, the rise of the romantic ideal, the custom of courtship, and the dispensing with the "marriage portion" have unsealed the well-nigh choked-up spring of sex-love. "Justification by faith," the suppression of masses, pilgrimages, and indulgences, the dispensing with altar and image, the open Bible, the lay chalice, and the unadorned "meeting house" have done much to rout commercialism from religion. The protection of the law is no longer for those only who can pay for it. The courts of justice need no longer be supported by the fees of suitors. Public hospitals and free dispensaries socialize the healing art. The printing-press and the free library have democratized the sweets of literature. The abolition of hireling armies, of imprisonment for debt, of child labor, and of the property suffrage are so many dykes reclaiming smiling stretches from the dreary waste of commercialism. The struggle is endless, for while the growth of personality is limit-

ing the power of the purse on the one side, the march of technique is broadening it on the other.

A lesser derivative interest is the *political*. Like wealth, a center of power is valued as promoting many kinds of satisfactions. Undoubtedly the earlier state-building forces are Fear and Greed. Groups ally themselves in order to make or resist attack. People dread the enemy, and hence cheerfully submit to the yoke of the war-leader. They tremble before the predatory, and therefore rally around a power that can make law respected. These fear forces are strongly seconded by the love of power which impels the masterful to supply more government than is needed. In time the absolute state arises in all its grimness, and men start back in affright before the Frankenstein they have created. There ensues a struggle to wrest from government guarantees of individual liberties and rights. Finally, it is recognized how much the distribution of wealth in an era of social production depends upon the state, and the people grapple with the classes for the mastery of power. During these four phases—military, civil, liberal, and social—of the political interest, while men are pouring out their blood and treasure, first to create and then to control the state, their groupings will depend much on their political feelings and politics will be a maker of history.

Since the feeling for the state is derivative, it varies with the importance of what the state does. Loyalty touches its zenith when blows ring harmless on the broad shield the state holds over her people. The flame of patriotism rises or sinks with the approach or retreat of violence. The state, moreover, enlists strong affections when it is the center of all kinds of co-operation and the active promoter of every form of culture. But with the triumph of peace, order, individual liberty, and popular government, the old fears and passions are forgotten. The industrial organization disengages itself from the political. The promotion of culture devolves more and more upon free associations. Religion relies for support on free-will offerings. Public opinion comes to be the great regulator of conduct. The non-political side of society comes forward, political concern dies down, and the state no longer plays a star part in the drama of history.

The *religious interest* is chiefly derivative. It contains, to be sure, an original factor in the craving for certain ecstatic experiences. Its prominence in the concern of mankind cannot, however, be laid to this craving. Like wealth and like government, religion has spread far beyond its first occasion, and insinuated itself into many channels of desire. The earliest non-religious force behind it is fear. *Primos in orbe deos fecit timor*. After man has by propitiation of the unseen powers assured his personal safety, he seeks to utilize them. He covenants with them that for regular prayer and sacrifice they shall grant increase and prosperity. The gods acquire economic importance. As they become more fully domesticated, they are approached with confidence, and worship is promoted by love and gratitude as well as by hope of benefits. With the advent of public worship religious feasts endear themselves as occasions for "orgiastic gladness" and "hilarious revelry." In the phallic cults they are prized as stimuli to sexual desire. Moreover, the common worship of the gods for public ends makes them props of order, bulwarks of family, property, and state. When the ethical sense becomes active, the gods come to be thought of as deliverers from temptation rather than from misfortune. One craves from them a clean heart rather than a fat harvest. Philosophy then blends with the theory of the gods and religion aspires to answer the Why, Whence, and Whither of the restless intellect. In the priestly cults religion becomes a stepping-stone to power, and so enlists ambition. Then the fear of a too-masterful church seizes upon men and they fervently embrace the more spiritual forms of faith as vessels of deliverance.

Thus religion has run the whole gamut of the passions. It has been the storm-center of feeling. Fear, greed, lust, sociability, gratitude, ambition, the instinct for liberty, the ethical impulses, and the intellectual yearnings have, at one time or another co-operated with the specific religious craving to magnify religion to the prodigious dimensions of a history-making force.

The religious interest cannot but wax and wane with the adequacy of religion to meet the various needs of men. The

gods are remembered in danger, forgotten in prosperity. They are valued as a prop when the state rests on authority, discarded when government is founded on consent. They are relied on to safeguard rights only so long as Justice holds no sword. Every step in the mastery of nature and the control of men blunts the sense of dependence on the Unseen. Security from violence, or plague, or future torment lessens the poignancy of the religious feeling. As people come to look to the policeman for protection, to the physician for healing, to the inventor for victory, and to themselves for worldly success, their zeal in worship abates. Such sloughings leave religion purer and nobler, no doubt, but less able to control the destiny of society. Its new channel is deeper than the old, but far narrower.

The *intellectual interest* is likewise a blend of various desires. Had it been restricted to its primitive components, its rôle would have been insignificant. But these cravings have been reinforced from several quarters. In the first place, intellectual subtlety, always a coveted form of prowess, gratifies the egotic desires. Even in the early stages of culture a reputation for extraordinary wisdom gives the sage fame, power, and wealth. Later, learning confers distinction and is not without efficacy in bread-winning and mate-winning. At every social level, moreover, there is a standard of intelligence to be lived up to as well as a standard of decent consumption. As for real knowledge, it has always been means as well as end. The sciences were first cultivated as badges of leisure-class superiority. Later they were fostered because they allayed the dread of disease, banished fear of the supernatural, assuaged pain, prolonged life, brought victory, and, as technique, vastly expanded the production of wealth. They were cultivated, in short, because knowledge is power. When, moreover, we remember the meteoric career of speculative ideas which, besides molding lives and shaping institutions, have knit men together or marshaled them into hostile camps, the intellectual interest must be owned to be a factor in history of no mean importance.

Like the rest the intellectual interest has its ups and downs. It wanes as men lose faith in the efficacy of speculative ideas

and come to put their trust in labor or thrift. If "things are in the saddle," it is because the ideologies have not kept their promises. On the other hand, the triumphs of science lead men to value knowledge rather than religion or power. Science grants the health vainly besought by the worshiper; it turns aside the pestilence; it secures the husbandman his increase; it is a buckler against enemies. The decline of violence has, no doubt, done much to put the big brain above the strong arm, but even war is coming to be a test of intelligence rather than a test of brute strength. Knowledge and money, or, if you please, Science and Wealth, seem likely to become the heirs of the dying powers of the past.

Since food, sex, and safety are the most imperious, persistent, and universal wants of man, why, it may be asked, does not the sex-desire announce itself in history in some dramatic fashion? Why has no one offered a "genetic" interpretation of history?

The explanation seems to be that the sex-propensity does not group or array men. It embroils individuals (witness the "crimes of passion") but not tribes, classes, or nations. Unlike greed, it rarely precipitates mass collisions. Unlike fear, it does not inspire men to combined effort. Satisfied by the union of the sex-couple love, unlike hunger, does not give rise to co-operations, trades, and professions, the social division of labor. Nevertheless, on those rare occasions when they are summed together, the sex-desires constitute a stupendous social force. The most striking proof of this is the imposing of the monogamic relation upon the entire membership of society. The suppression of polygamy marks the triumph of the sex-needs of the many over the power of the few, and is, beyond question, the greatest anti-monopoly achievement on record. Perhaps the broadest encroachment ever made on the "right of the strongest" is the obliging of the rich and powerful to content themselves with one wife.

The distinction we have drawn between *original* and *derivative* social forces gives us a vantage-point from which to interpret the interpretations of history. We have seen that it is a mistake to lay the shiftings of interest to be discerned in the life of a

people solely to the evolution of wants: Oftener these shiftings are due to a disturbance in the relation of means to end, to a change in the capacity of the great secondary goods to promote the satisfaction of desires. Now, the moment the state reaches its broadest significance, the military-political interest seems to be the swaying force in history. The moment religion reaches its broadest significance, the religious interest appears as the chief welder or sunderer of men. Let these great interests decay, and other interests come forward and grasp the scepter they let fall. It happens that in our time certain well-understood influences have weakened the political and religious interests, and thereby thrown into bold relief the other interests, chief among which is the economic. The philosophy of wealth is hence the main key to the interpretation of contemporary life. On the strength of its success here it is now declared to be the "open sesame" of the locked chambers of the past, the one magic formula for the interpretation of history. Its only rival today is Intellectualism, the doctrine that makes the knowledge and *Weltanschauung* of each age the pivot of its entire social life. In my view nothing can rescue us from these one-sided theories save a knowledge of human wants and a recognition of the great variety of the springs that incite men to action. *The corner-stone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the social forces.*

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.